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THE RELEVAHCE OF ILLYP.IA FO!-'. LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

by Charles s. Rockwell

Introduction
In recent years, the unqualified assumption of profit maximization has
been criticized by leadin3 economists and a variety of alternatives postulated.

1

Tee debate has lar3ely had a positive cast.

In Professor :Iachlup's

words, ••• "(the theory of the firm) is designed to explain and predict changes
in observed prices (quoted, paid, received) as effects of rarticular changes
in conditions (wage rates, interest rates, import duties, excise taxes,
technolo3y, etc.)."

2

The nornative question, what should the firm maximize

(or "satisfy"), is not a part of the debate.

m1ile the operations research

literature is normative in emphasis, it is more concerned with how to
maximize profits rather than uhether to maximize profits.

In this paper

we provide a theoretical analysis of gro~-,th and efficiency in a business
organization that does not maximize profits, but instead maximizes profits
per worker.

The need for the analysis arises because enterprise laws similar

to those in Yugoslavia can lead firms to adopt this maximand.

These same

laws provide attractive inducements to political stability and generate a
high measure of economic equity.

Consequently, we argue that such a form

of enterprise organization is apt to be of considerable interest to planners
in mixed economies, if the long run production and growth of such firms can
be shown to be economically efficient.

1

As we note below, the analysis also

For a recent survey of the literature concerning the "marginalist contro
versy," see Professor Fritz i Tachlup 's "Theories of the Finn: Harginalis t,
Behavioral, Managerial," American Economic r,eview, 5 7 (196 7), pp. 1-33.
2

Ibid•• p. 9.

has relevaw::c iur th2, 1 'rnar8inalist contrm,2.rsy" and the "socialist controversy" •
It is 1.:'.Jt Sl!::-prir:in3 t!wt sccialist economists have been more interested
in explorin~ 2.lte.n:2_t:.ve mr.;dr.1ancb tha'J. have their capitalist counterparts.
Socialization cf: the means of p::..-. duction certainly brings the demise of the
c.:ipitali.::;t cnt,::::prise, hut its o:rz;mizat~.anal successor may take many forms,
all of wllic'i1 ir.:vi te an c.ppr.:i:i.s.:l.
ture, h0we-.;131:, i:::: cftc:1 lou.

The formal level of much of this litera-

S:i.nc2 mir.or vzri.'.lti".J,:s in enterprise organization

may inply 3:;:u:s d:'..:.::i:c:n•· ,e,2:1 i;; ,::cc;1~::nic behavior:- e ri13orous examination of

Socialist Economy.

1

Using tt2 2~z~cu of de~~ntr~liz~ti~ n to cl~ssify socialist enterprises,

Idealized fc:..1.:--: or j.-1~t·'_tT.!'.:ions in tlt·~ USSR, Chin:1 a;;.<l Yugosl~viu are treated

:•1os t imp or-

TL:_Sor:ic:,li.r:,:_Ec0~:-:::;7:y:_ 1:, St.J-:1.y of Ory,anizational Alter
ro~d~7 House, 1967).

2.
..
1-Il!y:,,.-_;_r,' w.::..· '.:1:c: R•.:,,,,:::::: ,L>:-,'.T:c!c2 in the D:1!'.:Pas th-'.".t rou 6 hly corresponds
to tod&y's Y,..:sosJ.L1i·2. The f-):~~1 o:~ .~nt''.:-:prise: o".'ganizo.tion we postulate for
Illyria is c!n ick.'..'..J.::.7,-::J ,-,!r:1ic:1 of \Jc.::kl;;:s S~li--r.1::nr.r;emen t as c~fined by
Yugoslc.-, : ~_,;.
Sin_c'.: otl1~:c fe?.t;.~:.:ss of tl1e; Yucos:t_;:--_-,, system, particularly the
Com:nu~ist i~a::'~J ,. -1 ..:..dc.olo::ry, .:.:~·c not ;-,_;,::s:.:r,:.cd, it c:::1J.not be too strongly
employed that our p::::-edicticns 2:..·2 no:: n<=c:':o.s:Ja:.:i:_y &pplicable to the typical
Yugosla~ enter?ri~c.

-

"
.:,

-

tantly, we investigate the properties of the model for the Harshallian long
run. 1

The introduction of technolozical progress and outward shifting demand

pemit us to draH additional conclusions concerning the characteristics and
efficiency of the Illyrian firm's crowth path.

Also, the tools developed to

deal with the lone run case, yield a better understanding of some of the
surprisinc results obtaine<l by ~Tard for the short run.

The next few introduc

tory paranraphs describe the Illyrian firm and offer a few additional reasons
why it is deservin~ of study.
Illyria is an idealized economy in which worker-managed plants l_)roduce
in a totally decentralized, free market environment.

By Illyrian law, enter

prises are under the control of a Horkers Council which is elected by the em
ployees of the firm on a one-man, one-vote basis.

This Council, in turn, se

lects a manager uho operates the firm in free competition with all other firms.
Inputs, outputs, techniques and price are as completely under the control of
the Illyrian firm as they are of the capitalistic firm.
cipal differences, however:

There are two ~rin

first, the government retains ownership of all

productive assets and charges a fee for their use; and second, although the
employees decide what portion of aarninr;s is to be paid out as personal in
come and what part is to be retained, the employee does not obtain any trans
ferable title to funds that are plowed back.
1

In both re3ards the Illyrian em-

The formal analysis contained in the Appendix to Chapter Eieht of The
·Socialist Economy applies only to the i!arshallian short run. This is also
true of Hard' s earlier article, "The Firm in Illyria - ~farket Syndicalism,"
American Economic Review, 48 (1958), pp. 566-89, and of Evsey Domar's "The
Soviet Collective Farm as a Producer Cooperative," American Economic Review,
61 (1966), pp. 734-57. Both Hard and Demar restrict their analysis to the
case where the total capital charge, "R," is a constant. We define R as the
per unit capital charge so that the tot al capita! charee, PJ(, is a variable.
In Chapter Nine of The Socialist Economy, Uard briefly considers one lon8 run
aspect of Illyrian economics that is also central to our analysis -- the capi
tal intensity of investment. Our conclusions on this matter (see page 14
below) are the same as his.

- 4 -

ployee qua owner differs from the capita list stockh older.

Throuz hout Illyria

it is assumed that worker s are comple tely self seekin3 , and management
deci
sions reflect the collect ive consens us of the worker s rather than any
alter
native goals.

Under these conditi ons it is reasona ble to postula te that the

worker s counci l will instruc t r.1ana3ement to maximi ze profits per worker
.

In

any event, since the analyt ical core of this study abstra cts from institu

tional details , the analys is is applica ble to any firm which does maximi
ze
profits per worker , re~ard less of the exact institu tional setting .
To the protag onists of the "socia list controv ersy", 1 the behavio r of
Illyria n firms is of obvious intere st.

It is one of the simple st organi zation

al forms satisfy ing the require ments of a Lane-e- Lerner decent ralized
social 
ist state.

A theore tical analys is of the efficie ncy of such organiz ations r~

fleets on the feasi-b ility of such a state. -This evidenc e gains in importa
nce
becaus e Illyria ab-stra cts import ant feature s of the Yugosl av system.

And

Yugosl avia is the leading example of a decent ralized , social ist state
in operation. _
This corresp ondenc e between the laws of Yugosl avia and the assump tions
of Illyria returns us to the "marci nalist- behavi orist" controv ersy •2 .
Decen·traliz ed sociali sm in Yu3osl avia provide s a new arena for testing whethe
r
gross simpli ficatio ns such as "firms behave as though they maximi ze profits
·per worker" . can be used to deduce operat ional hypoth eses concern ing
the
variab les describ ed by Profes sor Hachlu p.

Before this is possib le, howeve r,

a margin alist theory for Illyria must be articul ated, and that is the
prin
cipal concern of our work.
1
This literat ure is reviewe d by :Jard, The Social ist Economy, Chapte r 2.
2
Althoug h Hard carefu lly nrotec ts Illyria n theory from overly facile
applica tions to Yugosl av reality , he ueakens at a few points and confro
nts
the model with facts. For exampl e, see pages 584-5 of "The Firm in Illyria
".
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"Socialis t controver sy," "marginn list-behav iorist controver sy," both
phrases bespea!:: the maturity of the debate.

As mentioned at the outset a

more sir;nifica nt cause of the current interest in Illyria is from the point
of view of economic developme nt.

Abstracte d from its communist setting in

Yugoslav ia, Horkers Self-mana gement offers special attractio n for use in the
public sector of mixed economies .

A brief discussio n of some of the broader

political and economic implicati ons of Illyrian syndicalis m is worthwhi le.
Afterwhic h we turn to our main theme, the efficienc y of Illyria.
The principal allure of Illyrian syndicalis m is not so much the incen
tives it gives workers to maximize their l_)ersonal incomes by maximizin g enter
prise profits, for there are many bonus systems which can achieve this.
Rather, the attractio n is its equitable solution to the problem of the rights
of ownership , and its favorable implicati ons for the evolution of a democra
tic society.

The problem of obtaininr; an equitable distribut ion of ot-mership

must bedevil the most wise and ambitious r,overnmen ts of less developed coun
tries.

Certainly , the more ambitious the developme nt program, the more cri

tical is the mmership question.

For, as governmen t forces higher rates of

investmen t it concomita ntly causes a transfer of assets tm,1ar<l the expandinc
sectors.

This transfer of investibl e funds has its donor as well as its

beneficia ry, but the donation is· seldom voluntary .

The fortuitou s solution

where a landed gentry directly or indirectl y volunteer s funds to industry and
trade has not occurred in most LDC's, and the levers necessary to manufactu re
such an outcome are not known.

Conseque ntly, ambitious developme nt programs

must typically coerce funds often from the broadest strata of society, the
peasantry , and this is seldom done without a loss of political popularit y with

-

this strata.

6 -

One solution is to force the transfer but let ownership benefits

rest with the donor.

This, hmrnver, is seldom possible.

The alternati ve offered by Horkers Self-:mana gement is to pass the prero
gatives of ownership 1 forward to the employees of the expanding sectors. This
offers a broadly based, comparati vely equitable , redistrib ution of ownership
arnon3 the users of capital.

It is particula rly well designed to kindle in

the newly formed industria l work force an interest and enthusiasm for the
governme nt's developme nt pro3ram.
The capitalis t solution of ma!::inz trants or loans to existing entrepreneurs channels the investmen t returns paid for by the many into the hands of
the few.

It also alienates both the peasant and the urban worker from a

direct interest in the developme nt proGram.

In contrast, the centrally planned

solution ,-1hich in theory places the m-mership riehts of investibl e funds with
all the people, offers a hi~hly satisfacto ry outcome with respect to equity;
and by rnakinc all workers in the nodern sector directly dependent on the eovem
ment for employme nt, it also tends to increase the power and stability of that
governmen t.

A3ainst these advanta:3e s must be balanced the questiona ble effi

ciency of the centrally planned economies .

The trend of institutio nal reform

in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe towards creater decentral ization sug
gests that complete centraliz ation is a step in the developme nt sequence that
might profitabl y be skipped.
What we hope to resolve in this paper is whether the decentral ized Illyrian
firm can combine some of the equity attractio ns of the centrally planned firm
with the efficienc y commonly attribute d to the capitalis t firm.

Special

attention is given to the case of monopoly because this market structure ,
111

Preror;ati ves of ounership 11 , in this case, refers to the right to distri
bute current but not past profits.
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rather than perfect competition , more aptly describes the conditions under
which the Illyrian firm would most likely be incorporate d into a mixed econo
r.iy.

He first discuss monopoly, then incorporate perfect competition as a

limiting case, and finally consider the r:rowth path of a finn subject to ex
panding demand and technoloiic al proGress.

The Comparative Statics of Illyrian ':lonopoly
The Illyrian firm is presumed to maximize personal income per worker.
This is obtained as the difference between net sales per worker (after the
deduction of all r::iaterialo costs) and "interest" payments per worl:er.

The

interest charr,e is levied a~ainst all productive assets and is paid to the.
state.
(1)

The maximand of the firm, M, may therefore be exrressed as:
M =

I'Y - RK
L

where Y, Kand Lare output, capital and labor, and P and~ are the prices of
output and capital. 1 ' 2
In the 3eneral monopoly case the firm's demand curve is ne~atively sloped

1

n., the price of capital, is referred to as the "interest rate", althou2h
the "rental rate" mi3ht he more meanin[ful.
2

It is assumed that the supply of IC is infinitely elastic at the.price R,
and that workers can be freely hired or fired by mana~ement. Ar;ainst this last
condition, the objection has been raised that the workers, fearine; for the
safety of their individual jobs, may instruct management to maximize ?t sub
ject to the constraint (i) that no one be fired, or (ii) that the contraction
of the uork force be restricted to natural decrements due to retirements and
job sHitchin~. It is our feelin~ that consideratio n of these alternative ,
constrained models is most easily ~erformed as a special case of the uncon
strained model presented here. In most cases, the modificatio ns of the
basic theory implied by these restriction s is obvious.

- 8 -

and has a price elastic ity, 11, that declines as the quantity sold increase
s.
The producti on function is r!ell behaved •.lith symmetr ic assumpt ions concerni
n~
the effects of labor and capital on output includin c ~ositive first derivatives and ne~ative second derivati ves.

~eturns to scale,£ , and the labor and

capital output elastic ities, a and B, are function s of t!1e input vector
(L, K).
More restrict ively, ue assume that£ is :;reater than unity at the ori~in
and
declines u1onoton ically alon~ any ::,ositiv ely sloped isocline in the

(L, K) space.

That is, returns to scale decline wheneve r ue increase one output without
de1
creasin::i ; the other.
The conditio ns so far placed on the elastici ty of demand and the scale coeffic ient Bay be stated raathem atically as:

an
ay

cl£

< o ~ < o

cl£

aK

< o

At this point it is conveni ent to state three deductio ns from the above
assumpt ions tlia t •,rill be needed:
i)
ii)
iii)

£=a+ S; and less obvious ly

.£.5:. + ~
aL

aL

< o, and

~ +

2.£.

< o.

clK

aK

The first result is •1ell kno,m and needs no comr:1ent.

The second and third

results state tl1at the sur! of the direct effect of each inuut on its m-m
output elastici ty and tt1e indirec t effect of each input on the other inputs'
output elastici ty are ne:::ativ e.

ror labor, this ;.1eans that the ne:ative ef

fect of an increase in L on its o•m elastic ity, a, is ahmys sufficie nt
to
s~1amr, any nossible rositive effect ,-,hich the increase in L mny have on the
capital coeffici ent, S·

Althou[;h the last

t•10

results are not explici tly

used in the ieonetr ic analysi s, they nre implici t in nany of the compara
tive

1

This is the re~ular ultra pass um la•1 of H.a3nar Frisch.
of Product ion, n_and Mc?!ally E, Co., Chica~o , 1965, p. 120.

See The Theory

-
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static conclusi ons.
The first order conditio ns for an Illyrian long run optimum are:

L2 aM = RK - PY+ aPY (1 clL

(2)

LK clM = PYS (1 -

aK

.!)
n

l)
n

= o, and

RK = o.

These two equation s imply, respecti vely,
a =

PY - RK
and
PY (1 - _!)
n

Defining y = 1
(3)

RK

13 = - - - - -

PY (1 - .!_)
n

1
M, we arrive at the deceptiv ely simple equilibr ium conditio n

E: =

1
y

- y

-1

Since Illyrian behavio r is often so contrary to convent ional economic
intuitio n, a few uords of internre tation may be helpful .
tion 3, but its reciproc al:

E:

-1

= y.

Conside r not equa-

It is easily verified that Y may also

be defined as the elastici ty of total revenue with respect to output. 1
we now need is a correspo ndin~ly simple interpre tation of E:-l.
. to Farise.
. h 2
turn again

Uhat

For this ve

lle shous that if the price of both inputs are fixed,

than e: -l is equal to the capital ist elastici ty of total cost with respect to
output.

In some ceneral sense then, the Illyrian finn equates the percenta ge

increase in costs to the pcrcenta 3e increase in revenue; but this statemen t
needs to be clarifie d and made more precise.
lly assumpti on the price of capital, R, is fixed; however , the price of
labor, M, is our maximand and is obvious ly not fixed.

This raises the ques

tion of whether it is permiss ible to apply Frisch' s conclusi on that E: -l is

1
y
2

=l

-

aPY Y
n1 = aY
PY

Ibid., p. 167.
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the elas tici ty of cost .
wher e M is a maxira-...'!il.
inpu t pric es hold s.

It is perm issib le, but only at the opti mal
poin t
At this poin t aM/aY = o and the cond ition
of fixe d

Ue must also prov ide an Illy rian equi vale
nt of "cap i

tali st cost ."

Sinc e ML and RK alwa ys exha ust tota l reve
nue, PY (the re are
no resi dua l pro fits ), it is more mea ninc
ful to talk abou t tota l disb urse men ts
rath er than tota l cost . The refo re,£ -1 may
be desc ribe d as the elas tici ty
of tota l disb urse men ts for fixe d M. In equi
libri um, the perc enta ge chan ge in
reve nue must equa l the perc enta ge chan ge
in disb urse men ts (M fixe d). 1 If
outp ut is less than opti mal, an incr ease
will rais e reve nues fast er than dis
burs eme nts (at the subo ptim al valu e of M)
and perm it an incr ease in M; wher e
as if outp ut is grea ter than opti mal, a decr
ease will decr ease reve nues less
than disb urse ~cnt s and also perm it an incr
ease in M. Con sequ ently , Mis a
true maxim~-n if and only if the elas tici ty
of disb urse men ts (for the fixe d
valu e M) equ~ ls the elas tici ty of tota l reve
nue. Ue retu m now to a furt her
cons idc= ation of equa tion (3).
E,i'.rn.tio:1 (3) hes some surp risin c imp lica tion
s.

Under typi cal simp lify-

ing assu r:ipt icns use::! i::.1 Ecc:-.ometric tvork
-- £ and Tl cons tant s -- a long run
optimum does not exis t. 2 :'fore fore bodi nc
is the fact that if the init ial
valu e of£ is less than unit y, then no equi
libri um exis ts, even thou gh all
the rest of our assu mpti ons are met. Or,
in more fam iliar term s, no solu tion
exis ts when ever the firm has a mon oton icall
y risin c long run aver age cost 3
1
s ince tota l reve nue and tota l disbt ::-se ment s are iden
tica l, so the elas 
tici ty of tota l reve nue is alwt!.:.-s iden tica
lly equa l to the elas tici ty of tota l
disb urse men ts (M vari able ).
2
Exce pt unde r the unli kely cond ition that
the two cons tant s £ and y are
fort unat ely equa l. In that case the solu
tion is not dete rmin ate.
3
.
Sinc e w~ do not defi ne cost curv es for the
Illy rian firm , refe renc e here
is to the cond itioa s whic h woul d exis t for
a cap ital ist firm with iden tica l
tech nolo gy, and a com peti tive labo r mark et
with wage rate W. In Illy ria as
well as capi talis m, W is assum ed to be the
minimum acce ptab le rate .

- 11 --

exists in Figure 1 whenever the

pccsible if a~ a(Y) 2nd E

=

~(i) are unequal constants .

vcc3i~lc if c(Y) is cv2ry1~er e less th2n cne.

It is also not

This is because y(Y)

tivel::;: slc;:2d :·:::! k:s an init:i.21 V.:'..luc r:;re~ter than one. 1

-1

is posi-

Consequen tly there

~-s no dstc:;:-.ri:-:.:-,nt l;;,1.r; r--:1 sclut:i.cn for the Illyrian mo::opolis t if decreasin g

Bc::r,;_:::: :'..::.,·:--tit;:.:i::;_:1r: the; c-::,;rr:p~r'.ltivc str,tic implicati ons of our model,

1
P (Y.) f (Y) --- ..

in net revenue (p(Y)

?h·,:.J L'.,c fu•. .::tL.,;;~, r'

t:i.c:-.s £.:Ce

~h~ 8 -,~~:.,.

S>: (Y)

,:T'

= RK PY+ WL ).

•• I

'.'..ll_

·- ts ~~::ic,t.,;r,~.:~ally

:~nc:rc:::.~ins :.m<l c.onverges en

other c;:::;2s, the functicn p (Y) causes Capitalis t

positivl! wh2r.e;vei· Tl is greater than

(,~:c. V.:12.'.~':\s c-£ :i which a:.:-e ]_ess t1:'1n enc. can never be nc.xim•.!2s since they
ir,vclvc value:1 o E y (Y)- 1 :.:1d coase.qu2n t].y £ (Y) which P.1'."e negative. The
J.a.tte::~ oc~·.:r::: 1::hcn Ci;tpu'.: ts so lccrr;c th.:it further increases in inputs cause

.J
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FIGURE 1.

A

p(Y)y(Y)-1

1
. e:(Y)

,.,__

y
C

y
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output to be larger than Illyrian, and permits the existence of an equilibrium
under capitalism regardless of whether the demand and scale coefficient s are
constant, or whether returns to scale are decreasing,
To analyze the comparative statics of the model, we must first look more
closely at the behavior of e: over the space (L,K).

Just as we define iso

quants in on the input space, we may also define isoscale contours.

The slope

of these contours is given by the equation 8

dK
dL

ae:
clL
= - --= ae:
clK
e:

As described earlier, both

of:

1-•
e:

~+~

clL
clL
as
aa
aK + aK

cle:/aL and cle:/aK are negative, so this also is true

From the existing assumptions it is not possible to deduce the

curvature of the isoscale curves.

However, under the ruhric·of "well behaved

technology" we may reasonably assume that each isoscale curve is tangent
one and only one isoquant.

to

It is sufficient for this result that the curva

ture of the isoscale curves be everywhere either less than or more than that
of the isoquants.

Assuming this latter condition and defining the locus of

the tangencies as the Illyrian Crest we find that all points on one side of
the Crest have isoscales cutting isoquants from below (above), while all
points on the other side have isoscales cutting isoquants from above (below).
Figure 2 illustrates the location of the Illyrian Crest for the case
where the curvature of the isoscales is less than that of the isoquants.
Note that because we assume e: is decreasing in Kand L, it decreases as we

8These
contours are described by Frisch, ibid., page 122.
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move outwa rd alone the Crest .

The outer limit of the Illyri an econo mic re
gion is defin ed by the isosc ale curve for e: = 1. 1 Ue
may now deriv e outpu t
expan sion paths for diffe rent inter est rates and level
s of demand.
The disbu rserne nt equat ion used to gener ate an Illyri an
expan sion path is
(4)

To deriv e the expan sion path for a fixed value of R,
first selec t any value
of Y, next compu te for diffe rent level s of outpu t the
term PY/R, end final ly
draw a tan3e nt fron the K axis inter cept, PY/R, to the
isoqu ant for Y.

The

slope of this tange nt 3ives the maximum attain able value
of M/R (and conse 
quent ly M) which can be obtain ed by produ cing Y units
of outpu t with a fixed
inter est rate of R.

The locus of such point s for diffe rent outpu t level s and

the same fix~d R we call the expan sion path for R.
is gener ated by chan3 ing the singl e param eter R.

A famil y of such paths
Three prope rties of these

paths need to be noted .
First , ii Wis the capit alist comp etitiv e wage and if
Illyri an worke rs
refus e to work for less than this (min M = W): then for
any R the Illyri an
expan sion path is more capit al inten sive than its capit
alist count erpar t. 2
That is, in the space (L,K) '::he Illyri an path lies above
the capit alist path.
This is becau se the Illyri m1 worke r-man ager earns not
only the comp etitiv e
.
wage b u t a 1 so as h are o f t h e pro f 1.ts
M >
W
sot h at R
= R.

The tuo paths coinc ide

only at the termi nal point A corres pondi n~ to the zero
profi ts solut ion in

1

The optim ality prope rties of this parti cular conto ur
are furth er dis
cusse d on page 20. The iso3c ale curve fore: = 1 is deno
ted:_ .
2

This concl usion is also reach ed by Hard.
Economy.

See pace 212 of The Socia list
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Figure 1.

Second, for both the Illyrian and Capitalis t finns, the expansion

paths associate d with hi::;lter interest rates lie beneath those for lower in
terest rates.

Third, selection of the optimum output alon3 any eiven expan

sion path (R fixed) is sh01'm ,seoraetri cally as the point uhere the slope M/R
of equation (4) is maximized .

If an interior maximum is to exist M/R must

initially be increasin g near the origin, reach a maximum, and then decrease.
This pattern is shm-m in Fi~ure 3.
path EE

0 0

A

The maximw-,1 value MQ/Ro alonr; the expansion

is obtained at the output level Y

0

•

The other expansion path EE
1 1

lies beneath E E and is therefore dra~-m for an interest rate R which is
0 0
1
3reater than R • Usin~ these propertie s we can now analyze the com:iarati ve
0
static effects of a chan3e in the interest rate.
Consider an increase in the interest rate from R to R •
0

1

Since a change

in R has no effect on the y (Y)-l curve of Fieure 1, the nev solution for Y will
only involve a shift of the e::(Y) curve, either up, in Hhich case output increases, or dmm, in which case output decreases .

In either event, there uill

be a pesitive associatio n between the chanee in Y and in e::.

To detennine in

which direction e::(Y) will shift we must first determine the chan3e in Land K.
~Je assert that an increase in the interest rate will increase labor and decrease capital, movins the firm to the shaded area of Fi~ure 3.

The proof is

by contradic tion.
Since an increase in the interest rate moves the firm from E E to E E ,
0 0
1 1
and since E E lies every,:-1here beneath E E , we knou that a movement in the
1 1
0

0

opposite northwes terly direction where capital increases and labor decreases
is not possible.

Suppose, however, ue move to the unshaded area beneath E
0
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character ized by a decrease in both Kand L.

In this area output is smaller

and the scale coefficie nt lar~er than at Y but this is a contradic tion of
o'
the above conclusio n that chanzes in e: and Y must be positivel y related. The
converse arzurnent holds for increases in both K and L.

Therefore ,

~-1e

move to

the shaded area as asserted.
The effect of an increase in the interest rate on output can now be
solved by asking "What is the value of the scale coefficie nt uhen we optimally produce an output of Y uith an interest rate of R ? 11 That is, what is
0
1
the value of e: at the intersect ion of the expansion path E E and the isoquant
1 1
Y • If e: is greater at this point than it is at Y , then the e: (Y) curve is
0
0

shifted up and output increases .
dmmward and output decreases .

If e: is less, then the E:(Y) curve is shifted
But the sign of the change in

£

is detennine d

by whether or not the isoscale curves cut the isoquants from below.

There

fore, the sign of the chanre in output depends upon which side of the Illyrian
Crest ue are:

the location of the Crest has a critical importanc e not found

in the Capitalis t economy.

'!e uay forraally summarize our results for changes

in the interest rate as follous:
(5)

-<

aK
aR

aL
o, - >

aY >
-=
aR <

0

aR

as -

0

and

dK

>
<

dL
y

dK
-dL
E

Ambi~uity concernin c the sizn of aY/aR in Illyria is not so surprisin :;
when we recall that similar ambi:;uiti es also exist in capitalis t economics .
Not with respect to clY/aR, but Hith respect to clL/aR.

That is, an increase

in R causes an increase in capitalis t employment due to a substitut ion of
labor for capital, but a decrease in enployrnen t due to a contractio n of out-
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put.

The resultin3 si~n of aL/ar: is uncertain, although aK/an. and aY/aR

are both definitely negative.

In Illyria, aK/a~ and aL/a~ are respectively

negative and positive, but aY/af is uncertain.

The important role of the

Illyrian Crest is easily understood if we break the effect of an increase
in

R

down into two movements; first, a novement southeast aloni the isoquant

Y until the neu expansion path E E is encountered; and second, a movement
1

1

0

either fori:1ard or backward along E E

1 1

countered.

until a new optimal output Y

1

is en

If during the first le~ of this movement (output held constant)

e: is increasinr;, then the second le: must involve an increase in Yin order
t owar d sits
.
.
·
· h y (Y)-l •
t ore d uce e: ( ")
J.
new intersection
uit

true if e: is decreasin~ durin,:: the first le~.

The opposite is

Thus, the Illyrian Crest

simply partitions (L,;:~) into two sections accordinr:-; to ~-,hether the first
leg described above involves an increase or a decrease in e:•

It is less

surprisinc that the sip,n of aY/aR is ambi3uous, than it is that the ambi3uity
can be resolved by such a sireple concept as the Illyrian Crest.
Two additional results of interest concern the extreme cases when either
the scale coefficient is a constant, or uhen the elasticity of demand (for a
fixed de~and curve) is a constant.

In Fi3ure 1, if e:(Y) =£,then no change
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in output can occur in response to changes in R.
dK
dL

Thus,

dK
dL

=-

y

e: , dR

That is, an increase in the interest rate causes a movement downward along an
isoquant.

On the other hand, if y(Y) =

y,

then Y may change but e: may not.

Thus,
dK

=

dL
y, dR

dK
dL
e:

That is, an increase in the interest rate causes a movement downward along an
isoscale curve.

Usin:3 the tools developed above it is quite easy now to

determine the effect of a shift in demand.
An arbitrary shift in the demand curve will disturb the equilibriu m pic
tured in Figure 1 by shiftinc both y(Y) and E:(Y).

As a temporary ex!>edient

we simplify the analysis by assuning that demand shifts in such a way that
the price elasticit y of demand for a riven value of output is not affected by
the shift.

Conseque ntly, under this stronz assumptio n a shift in demand does

not alter the curve y (Y} in Figure 1.

This greatly simplifie s the analysis

since adjustmen t must noH occur via the scale coefficie nt alone.

He proceed

by derivine a set of expansion paths for different values of P.
Since the expansion paths in Fir;ure 3 are derived for constant values of
both P and R the same family of curves exists for analyzing price changes as
for interest rate chances.

An essential differenc e, houever, is that the ex

pansion paths for hieher prices lie above those of lower prices which is
just the opposite from what we found for the interest rate.

To prove this we
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need only note that a shift in demand raises P, thereby increasing the inter
cept term, PYo/Ro, in equation (4).

As a result then~, tangency to the iso

quant Y must lie above the original one.
0
cause a movement uoward from path E E

0

0

Thus, outward shifts in demand

to path E E •
2 2

It must then follow that

increases in demand lead to increases in the capital stock, but decreases in
emnloyment.

The net effect of this is to increase output if the isoscale

curves cut the isoquant from above at the point of equilibrium , but to decrease
output if the isoscale curve cuts the isoquant from below.
generates a negatively slooed supoly curve for output.

The latter case

He may summarize our

results by:
(6)

aK
aP

> 0

aL
aP

aY
aP

=

<
0
>

as

< 0

and

dK

dK
dL

>
<

=

dL
y

e:

The two extremes, a constant elasticity of demand and a constant scale
coefficient , lead to results which are identical to those obtained for changes
in the interest rate:
dK
dL

=

dK
dL

e:' dP

dK
dL

=

dK
dL

y

e: ' dR

dK
dL

Y, dP

and

=-

dK
dL

=-

Y, dR

e:

Also, from the appendix we find the following close association between the
comparative static effects of changes in the interest rate and shifts in de
mand which keep ·n constant.

-

"l T'
0"
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clL

-= -

-= -

an

dY
and finally , dR
p

R

If it were true that demancl shifts mainta ined a constan t elastic ity,
the
above symmet ry woul<l provide an enpiric ally useful rule for usin3; the
r;ov
ernmen t-contr olled intere st rate to brini about desired chan3es in output.
Unfort unately , we have little inform ation concern ing the pattern of
demand
shifts in the develop ed or less develop ed countr ies.

The Compar ative Statics of Illyria n Perfec t Compe tition
Perfec t compet ition is most easily treated as a limitin g case of the
genera l monopo ly analys is.

Settinr , the elastic ity of demand equal to infini

ty causes the Y(Y) curve in Figure 1 to be horizo ntal at unity.

Theref ore,

the compet itive equilib rium, if it exists , will be somewh ere on the
isosca le
contou r for e: = 1.

Follow ing Frisch , we call this contou r the curve of tech
nically optimura scale 1 and denote it by~. The termino loey is approp
riate
since this locus is the set of all input combin ations which corresp ond
to
minimum points on the long run average cost curves of capita list firms
(dif
ferent points one: corresp ond to differe nt values of W/R).

The conclu sion is

then that if perfec t compet ition exists , the level of output will be
tech
nically optimum re2;ard less of what value M takes.

1

Ibid., p. 122.
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The compa rative static effect s of change s in the intere st rate
and
demand can be taken direct ly from the monop oly analys is under
the !)artic ular
condit ion -y(Y) -1

= 1.

aK

(7)

-

aR

<

0

aL

-

' aR

> 0

aK

- > o , -aL
<o

aP

aY >
-=
a~ <

aP

0

as

dK

<
= >

dL
£

dK

dL

y

If the isosca le contou rs cut the isoqua nts from below, then aY
P l o and the
cl-

supply curve for each £inn is ne~ati vely sloped .

Thus, there exists the

possi bility of an unstab le inters ection of indust ry supply and
demand.
Furthe r analys is of this case is worthw hile.

If for all firms in the

indust ry the curvat ure of; is everyw here less than that of
Y, and if indus
try supply and demand have an unstab le inters ection , then barrin
g new entry
any displa cemen t of price above the equili brium level will tend
to zenera te
a sequen ce of increa ses in per-wo rker income and decrea ses in
output that con
tinues until there exist only one man firms produc ing with highly
capita l
intens ive techni oues.
conto ur£.

-This movement is alvays northw est alone the isosca le

Since we assume that the len:3th of the work week is fixed, the
one

man firm puts a lower bound on outpu t, albeit a contri ved one.
Consid er the other possi bility -- a downward displa cemen t of
price from
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the original eauilibril.llll .
occurs.

A sequence of falling prices and increasing outputs

New workers are hired and capital is decreased as we move dolmward

along e:.

This sequence, however, may be broken in two ways.

First, earnings

per worker may decline to the point that the existing firms cannot hire the
additional workers needed to maintain increases in industry output.

Assuming

a perfect labor market, this will occur when each firm has gone dm-mward along
e: to the point where this isoscale curve intersects the Capitalist expansion

path.

Further decreases in price cannot be met by increases in output which

means we have arrived at a vertical section of the supply curve.

Second, if

in moving downward along e:, the firm encounters the Illyrian Crest before it
encounters the Capitalist expansion path, then
dK

becomes greater than

dL

dK
-dL

e:

y

and the slope of the supply curve becomes positive.

Thus, whenever an unstable

intersectio n of industry supply and demand occurs, it is bounded above and
below by two other intersectio ns, both of which are stab le.

When the exist

ence of heterogeneo us firms is allowed for the possibility of an unstable
equilibrium becomes even less probable.

What emerges from our analysis is

that the competitive Illyrian long run industry supply curve is more inelas
tic than its Capitalist counterpart , but nevertheles s is positively sloped
and is composed of firms producing at the minimum point on their LRAC curves.
A brief description of short run competitive adjustment is needed as a
background for constructing scenarios of long run adjustment.

Figure 5 shows

the short run response of an Illyrian firm which is displaced from a competi-
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tive equilibr ium by an increase in price.

At point A on expansio n path EE
0
0

0

the firm produces an optimal output Y conditio nal on a fixed capital stock of
0
K and an interes t rate R and price P.
0
0
·

If price is raised to P , the firm
1
moves backward along K to the expansio n path E E which is defined for the
0
2 2
paramet er pair (P , R ) . The short run equilibr ium at A must be characte rized
1
0
1
by an output smaller than Y • Consequ ently, the short run competi tive supply
0

0

curve is alwa)7s negativ ely sloped.

In the lonfj run, however , even without the

entry of new firms, existing enterpr ises move outward along E E until they
2 2
again reach the isoscale contour £. Output at A will be zreater if the iso
2
scale contours cut the isoquan ts from above at A and smaller i f ~ versa.
0

An analogou s pattern , with signs reversed , may be derived for changes
in the

interes t rate.
Compari son of this sequenc e of events with the typical Capital ist se
quence clarifie s why we obtain such eccentr ic predicti ons for Illyrian be
havior.

These eccentr icities derive from the fact that the princip al effect

of changes in price is the composi tion of factor in~ts .and rewards rather
than upon the level of output.

The effect of changes in price on producti on

are more closely akin to changes in the Capital ist wage rate than the Capi
talist price of output.

The same clo9e associa tion for Capital ist economie s

is found between price and profits so it is not surprisi ng that the returns
of Illyrian workers

~

owners would have a similar property .

The princip al

conseque nce of fusing ownersh ip with labor input is to make the supply re
sponse of existing firms less flexible than it is under Capitali sm.
Irt the long run, assuming perfect markets and free entry one mieht
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expect that the two system s uould move to identi cal soluti ons
concer nin~ the
number of finns, output levels and factor propo rtions .
the case.

This is not typica lly

The Illyri an soluti on will differ from the capita list soluti on
if

the effici ency of firms is not identi cal, which , of course , is
genera lly true.
Becaus e of this the Illyri an compe titive soluti on cannot be pareto
optim al.
Our reason in~ is as follou s.

Suppos e that there are two firms, both of which

have identi cal techno lor,ies in the sense that they have the
same isosca le
contou rs, but differ in that one is more effici ent so that its
output iso
quants are unifor mly hieher .

The curve of techn ically optimum scale is the

same for the tHo firms, but the more effici ent firm produc es
on this curve to
the northe ast of the less effici ent firm.

The existe nce of differ ent margin al

rates of substi tution among firms is in violat ion of the pareto
criter ion.

-_26
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Efficiency and the Growth of the Illyrian Firm
Having derived the comparative static effects of a shift in demand, we
may move closer to our paramount interest
of organization in development programs?

How useful is the Illyrian form
In particular, we take up how ef

ficiently market syndicalism responds first to increases in demand and
second to improvements in technology.
Up to this point, we have attempted to keep the assumptions of the
analysis as general as possible.

The principal restrictions were a well

behaved production function obeying the regular ultra passum law, and a
downward sloping demand curve with declining price elasticity.

In order to

generate more meaningful and operational hypotheses concerning the behavior
of Illyrian firms over time, it is necessary to strengthen the postulates
by ruling out, hopefully, less likely states of the world.
~ltr~ .2_assum law itself.

First, the regular

A stronger alternative, adopted in the following

sections, is that the curvature of the isoscale contours is strictly less than
that of the isoquants.

This is equivalent to assuminr. the two joint conditions

that the scale coefficient does not increase whenever output (not one of the
inputs) is increased., and also does not increase along an isoquant whenever
we move away from the Illyrian Crest.

Al though we lack empirical evidence

defining changes in~ in terms of output rather than inputs seems to be a
restrictive but not unreasonable assumption.

If all existing firms and potential entrants have identical technologies,
Illyrian perfect competition is pare to optimal.

Free entry, in this case,

generates a horizontal long run industry supply curve at the same level, and
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using the same facto r prop ortio ns as for comp
etitiv e capi talis m.

Howe ver,

if new entr ants are succ essiv ely less effic ient
as defin ed on page 25, then
in addi tion to the stat ic inef ficie ncy cause
d by diffe ring marg inal rates of
subs titut ion, we also have the dyna mic probl
em that the most effic ient firms
with er away. The ar3um ent is that as indu stry
demand expa nds, price s rise and
intra -mar gina l firm s beei n to earn a "pur e prof
it" for thei r work er-m anag ers.
This caus es the intra -mar eina l firm s to move
upwa rds alon g the optio nal tech nica l effic ienc y locu s,
toua rds more capi tal inten sive tech niqu es.
But,
sinc e they must ultim ately pass over the Illyr
ian Cres t, at this poin t,
outp ut for the effic ient intra -mar sina l firms
begi ns an unen ding decl ine.
Thus , the pred ictio n of a with ering away of
firms is valid ated so that the
most effic ient firm s prod uce the leas t outp ut.
Clea rly, indu strie s with
risin g costs of supp ly are not good cand idate
s for the estab lishm ent of mark et
synd icali st ente rpris es. This cond ition is
suff icien tly common that it raise s
serio us ques tions abou t the effic ienc y of Illyr
ian orga niza tions when ever the
number of selle rs is larr, e.

e,
A

The mark et stru ctur e of 3rea test inte rest howe
ver is for one, or a few,
selle rs. Hhen mark et synd icali st firm s ori1?
;inate unde r gove rnme ntal spon sorship they will typi cally be for key proj ects
that esta blish new indu strie s.
The perfo rman ce of Illyr ian· type orca niza tions
in the limi ting mono poly case
is criti cal. To incre ase the relev ance of the
anal ysis we turn our techn olog y
assum ption a notc h tigh ter, but loose n the dema
nd assum ption . We assum e that
the mono polis t poss esse s a prod uctio n func tion
that r,ene rates an "L" shap ed
long run avera ge cost curv e unde r capi talis m.
This means that the scal e co-
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efficien t must be initiall y greater than one, decline until it equals one, and
remain at one for all lar3:er outputs .

Hhile a similar conclusi on can be

reached without this assumpt ion, its addition puts certain types of Illyrian
behavio r in clearest focus.
support this variant.

There is, of course, r;ood empiric al evidence to

On the other hand, ue no lonr;er require demand shifts to

leave the elastici ty of demand invaria nt.

This enables us to conside r the more

probable case where outuard shifts in demand increase the price elastic ity.
Figures 6 and 7 present the output and input solution s usin£ this assumption .

As demand shifts outward we presume that the elastici ty of demand

is increase d so that y(Y)-1 shifts do~mward from y-1 to -1
yl
0
wards from

E

0

to

E

1

, and output increase s from Y to yl.
0

'

dY) shifts up-

Further outward

shifts in demand, however , can never increase Y above Y • This is more clear
max
ly seen in Figure 7. If the initial Y is belou the Illyrian Crest, an in
o
crease in demand moves the firm upwards towards

E.

Labor input may initiall y

increase , but must ultimate ly decrease as further price rises cause the firm
to uove upwards alone E.

Hhen the firm passes over the Illyrian Crest it has

an output strictly less than Y
, and a fortiori this is true as it moves
max
northwa rd and asymtot ically approach es E.
Our conclusi on concerni nc the efficien cy of market syndical ism for
monopol y is similar to those for perfect competi tion.
output of the firm is blocked by the isoscale contour E.

As demand increase s,

This places an

absolute limit on the output of the monopo list that cannot be breached
regardle ss of the position of the demand curve.

Even in the case where both

the Illyrian and Capital ist monopo lists both operate belm11 Y
, the Illyrian
max
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firm has smaller output than its Capita list counte rpart and is therefo
re
more destruc tive to pareto optima lity.

If free entry is possib le at risin~

costs, ~,e are again faced with the problem of intra-m arginal firms having
unequa l marr;in al rates of substit ution between capital and labor.

Hhatev er

the market varian t adopted for purpos es of analys is, the efficie nt expans
ion
of an Illyria n economy demands comple tely free and rapid entry of new
firms.
We turn next to a consid eration of techno logical progre ss.
The analys is of techno lo~ical change is similar to that employe d by
Hurray Droun. 1 Techni cal advance is divided into two tY!JeS -- neutra
l and
non-ne utral -- each of which may be further subdivi ded into tHo classes
.

Neu

tral techno logical progres s involve s alterat ions either in the scale
of units
which relate output and inputs (referr ed to by Drown as changes in efficie
ncy),
or alterat ions in returns to scale as neasure d by

E:•

Non-ne utral techno logi

cal proeres s involve s alterat ions either in the margin al rate of substit
ution
between inputs, or alterat ions in the elastic ity of substit ution.
Consid er first a neutra l techno logical advance that improv es efficie ncy
but does not affect returns to scale.

For exampl e, the slope of the output

surface in any directi on is multip lied at all points by a scalar Breate
r
than one.

This is illustr ated in Fir;ure 2 by an upward labelin c of all

isoqua nts, but no change in the isosca le contou rs.

The locatio n of the

Illyria n Crest is not affecte d Lut the labelin: :,; of the expans ion paths
for
specif ic price levels is.

P-eturn in~ to equatio n (4), if Y is the old out
o

put at (L, K) and Y is the new output for this input combin ation,
then
1
0
0
the expans ion path through (L , 1~ ) initial ly derived for P is now the
one
0

1

0

0

nrm-m, Hurray , On the Theory and Measure ment of Techno logical Change ,
(Cambr idge Univer sity Press, London , 1966), especi ally Chapte r II.
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deriv ed for P = P yo.
1
.
0
1

This follow s from the symm etric manne r in which

P and Y enter equat ion (4).
for P

0

Since P is less than Pc·'' the new expan sion path
1

lies north east of the one passi ne throug h (L, K ).
0

0

The impli cation s

of a neutr al impro vemen t in effici ency of the ty~e descr
ibed above are comr>lete ly analag ous to those for an upuar d shift in the
demand curve when the
elast icity of demand (and there fore they curve ) is kept
const ant. Con
seque ntly, labor is decre ased, capit al is incre ased and
the chang e in outpu t
depen ds on the locat ion of the Illyri an Crest .
~Jext consi der a neutr al techn olo~i cal advan ce that impro
ves effici ency
and also raise s the scale coeff icien t at all level s of
outpu t.

For examp le,

multi ply all slope s by a scala r facto r that itsel f incre
ases with outpu t.
In this case, the isoqu ants are relab eled up,mr ds and
the isosc ale conto urs
are relab eled do,mN ards.

The forme r effec t is descr ibed above , the latte r

effec t invol ves an upwar d shift in the curve e:(Y).
The long run conse quenc es of this react ion to neutr al
techn ologi cal pro
gress are quite negat ive.

Impro vemen ts in the effici ency of produ ction tidll

lead to reduc tions in the outpu t and labor input s of
all firms which are
north west of the Illyr ian Crest .

Moreo ver, even if a firm is initia lly

south east of the Crest , the impro vemen ts in effici ency
cause the accum ulatio n
of capit al and layinr ; off of labor lllltil ultim ately all
firms lie north west
of the Crest where outpu t is decre asing .

The only quali ficati on of this

resul t is that there may be an offse t tine effec t from
an outtrn rd shift of e: (Y).
Altho ugh this latte r case might be of impor tance in some
indus tries, it is not
the typic al case.

Thus, the dange rs of a backw ard bendi n~ suppl y curve ,
which

tJard point ed out for short run perfe ct comp etitio n, also
exist with respe ct to

technolor;ical progress.

As firms become more efficient, their supply curves

shift inward so that prices rise and quantity supplied declines.
becomes essential that new firms steadily enter the market.

It therefore

But even this will

not achieve optimality if firms are heterogeneous.
The effects of non-neutral change is more difficult to assay.

Consider

first, changes in the mar~inal rate of substitution that do not affect the
elasticity of substitution,

Suppose that at an initial point of equilibrium

(L ,K) the marginal product of labor is raised and the marginal product of
0
0
capital is lowered in such a way that e:

0

and Y are not·altered. 1
0

The reader

can easily verify that such an increase in the slone of the isoquant Y cmust
0

lead to a substitution of labor for capital if the quantity Y

o

is to be pro

duced.
However, if we are northwest of the Illyrian Crest, this substitution along
Y causes the optimal isoscale curve to lie above the new input point, and
0
this induces an increace in output.

If He are southeast of the Illyrian Crest,

a parallel argument deduces a decrease in output.

He conclude that an increase

in the marginal product of labor relative to the marginal product of capital
must increase labor, decrease capital and have an ambir,uous affect upon out
put.

Under these same assumptions a relative increase in the marginal pro

duct of capi~al has the op!)osite affect.
labor decreased.

That is, capital is increased and

It is obviously important that government µolicy be directed

towards raising the marginal product of labor relatively faster than the mar
ginal product of capital.

1

see the appendix page __ for a mathematical derivation of this case.

~
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Techni cal chan~e which affects only the elastic ity of substit ution is
particu larly relevan t to an analys is of enterp rise expans ion.

As Profes sor

Stigle r emphas izes, there is not one but rather many differe nt "long
runs. 111
Increas es in the time duratio n of the analys is is apt to increas e the
elas
ticity of substit ution by permit ting the firm to overcome bottlen ecks
through
researc h and the adoptio n of more compli cated existin c techno logies.

For

the capita list firm, therefo re, an increas e in the period of analys is,
in
creases the elastic ity of substit ution and thereby the growth of the
finn
2
and the economy.
Is this also true of Illyria ?
In the absence of any change in the curvatu re of the isosca le contou rs,
a flatten ing of Illyria n isoqua nts tends to make the supply curve for
output·
more vertic al than it otherw ise •1ould be.

(The extreme case of perfec tly in

elastic supply occurs when the isosca le contou rs and the isoqua nts have
identic al curvat ures.)

tie rai~ht expect , howeve r, that factors which make iso

quants more linear would have the same affect on isoscal e contou rs.

If so,

we cannot predic t the affect on the elastic ity of supply; but we can
see that
movements along a flatter e: will cause a more rapid substit ution of capita
l
for labor as demand expand s or efficie ncy improv es.

Our conclu sion must be

that a consid eration of longer time spans, when capita l and labor become
more perfec tly substit utable , leads to even less satisfa ctory compar isons
with the capita list firm than does a compar ison based upon shorte r time
spans.

1

George Stigle r, "Produ ction and Distrib ution in the Short Run,"
Journa l of Politic al Economy, Vol. 47, No. 3, (June 1939), p. 311.
2
Murray Brown, .£.E_, cit., p. 27.

The
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A truly dynamic theory of the expansion of the firm would describe the
time path of capital, labor and output.
this paper.

Such a theory is beyond the scope of

IIouever, a comment on the investment decision and "plow-back"

is called for.

One might expect, that if there were no alternative outlets

for investible funds other than plowing them back into the enterprise, and if
the collective time preferences of workers were positive but less than the
lending rate R, the workers might vote to reinvest some of their earnings.
The benefit would be increased production next period.
houever.

This is not correct,

The fact that retained earnin~s are charged the full rate

R

makes

it irrational to invest own funds in order to reduce the internal rate of
return to the internal rate of time preference.

Thus, all profits in Illyria

will be paid out in wages and none will be reinvested in the enterprise.

Summary
The essential relationship for analyzing the long run efficiency and
growth of the Illyrian firm is given by equation (3) and illustrated in
Figure 1.

It states that profit per uorker will be maximized tihen the scale

coefficient equals the inverse of the elasticity of total revenue with respect
to output.

This is equivalent to the intuitively more plausible condition

that the elasticity of cost be equal to the elasticity of total revenue.

It

is immediately seen that solutions to this optimality problem tiill not exist in
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certain econorai cally importa nt cases:

most notably, when the scale coeffi

cient is everywh ere less than or equal to unity.

A comparis on with the

Capital ist solution to the sa1:1e problem indicate s that monopoly output in
Illyria will always be no creater than Capital ist output and will be equal
only in the zero profits case.
The compara tive static effects of increase s in the interest rate and
shifts in demand (which maintain s a constan t price elastici ty at any given
level of output) are inversel y related by the formula on pages 16, 18, and 19.
A rise in the interes t rate leads to an increase in labor and a decrease in
capital.

An upi,ard shift in demand leads to a decrease in labor and an in

crease in capital.

The net effect of these conflict inG chan3es in factor in

puts on output depends upon the curvatu re of the isoscale contours .

At the

point of equilibr ium, if the isoscale contour cuts the isoquan t from below, a
rise in the interes t rate leads to an increase in output; and an upward shift
in demand leads to a decrease in output.
isoquan t from above, the opposite is true.

If the isoscale contour cuts the
The importan ce of the curvatur e of

the isoscale contours is a notable feature of Illyrian economi cs.
Perfect competi tion is treated as a limiting case where the elastici ty
of total revenue with respect to output is unity.

~.re affirm Hard's conclusi on

that in the short run a rise in the interes t rate increase s output, while a
rise in price decrease s output.

In the lon~ run, however , it is argued that

any negative ly sloped secment of the firm's supply curve uill be bounded above
and below by inelasti c or positive ly sloped segment s.

This, together with the

aggrega tion of heteroge neous firms to obtain the industry supply curve, makes
it quite unlikely that an unstable intersec tion of industry supply and demand
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will occur .

It does mean, howev er, that Ward is corre ct in asser ting
that

long run indus try suppl y will be highl y inela stic.
A serio us failur e to meet paret o optim ality stand ards
is encou ntered in
Illyri an comp etitio n (or, for that matte r, whene ver an
indus try struc ture with
hetero geneo us firms is postu lated ). The comp etitiv e firm
alway s produ ces at
a point of techn ically effic ient scale , which is to say,
it is alway s locate d
on the isosc ale conto ur fore: equal to unity , or in our
notat ion the conto ur

-f:

While this is paret o optim al if all firms have the same
effici ency, this

is not true if hetero geneo us effici ency chara cteris tics
cause firms to have
diffe rent value s of incom e per worke r.

In this case, the more effic ient firms

produ ce in the north west portio n of~ where the margi
nal rate of subst itutio n
betwe en capit al and labor is highe r.

These interf irm differ ences in the mar

giona l rates of subst itutio n betwe en capit al and labor
viola te the paret ian
c:rite rion.
The dynam ic behav ior of the Illyri an firm is analy zed
with respe ct to
contin uing outwa rd shift s in demand and techn ologi cal
progr ess. Assum ptions
are altere d in this sectio n so that the scale coeff icien
t is a nonin creas ing
funct ion of outpu t rathe r than the input s (or equiv alent
ly, the isosc ale con
tours do not cut the isoqu ants from above ). For perfe
ct comp etitio n, this
means that outwa rd shift s in demand or impro vemen ts in
effici ency due to
neutr al, techn ologi cal progr ess will cause firms to move
north west along 1t:
Since both labor and outpu t decre ase in this direc tion,
the firms with the
most effic ient techn ologi es will have the small est labor
input s and small est
outpu t.
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The expansion of the Illyrian monopolist with respect to demand shifts
and neutral technolocic al progress is similar to that of the Illyrian competi
tor in that they both move "alone"£•

Houever, while the competitor is ex

actly on£ the monopolist moves along but inside it.

The distance inside is

determined by the extent to which the elasticity of total revenue is greater
than unity.

This means that for the empirically important case of an "L"

shaped capitalist LRAC curve, the Illyrian monopolist will never achieve even
a minimally efficient scale.
demand shift that is assumed.

This conclusion is independent of the type of
The logical extreme implied by continuinc out

ward shifts in deraand and neutral iuprovement s in technologic al efficiency is
a one-man firm producin~ a saall output 1-1ith a large amount of capital.
In judging the potential value of such an orr,anizatio nal form in the
context of developraent programs, is it really true that Illyria will score as
poorly by efficiency criteria as the last few paragraphs imply?

Ho, not if

the rapid entry of new, equally efficient firms can be assured.

Touard this

end the government must collect and make available to potential entrants
relatively elaborate data on rates of return to investment, as well as assure
easy access to capital.

However, the constant need to generate new finns

as old ones whither is an outcome that could appeal to only the most perverse
plannine bureaucraci es.
Our theoretical testing of the Illyrian model yields agreement with
Professor Uard's conclusion that " ••• (it) provides a strong measure of industrial democracy," 1 and we might add political stability and economic equity.

1
lJard, The Socialist Economy, p. 254.
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iiowever, we differ inportantly from his conclusion" ••• that a pareto optimal
equilibriur,1 can be sustained by (the) Illyrian or3anization, eiven appro
priate and apparently not oven,helmingly difficult action by the state with
respect to macroeconomic policy. 111

This is true only in the artificial case

where we have completely free and effective entry of homogeneous firms.
Heterogeneity destroys the eptimality of Illyria and monopoly !)ower has an
even more restrictive effect on output in Illyria than in capitalism.

Hhile

one can achieve optimal results by havin~ a special interest rate for every
firn, both the administrative morass and the reduction of incentives are apt
to reduce productivity importantly.
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The Illyrian Crest is defined as the locus of tanzenc ies between iso
quants and isoscale contour s.

Since the slope of any isoscale contour is
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The possibility of a nep,ative supply response is quite sensitive to the
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If we use an upward shift in a linear demand function such

that the slope is not changed by the shift, we can show that ;; is always
positive.

This is done by derivinz the followin:3 two expressions for shifts

in linear demand curves:
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A calculus derivation for the effects of technological progress is given·
only for the case of a non-neutral increase in the marginal product of labor
relative to the marginal product of capital.

He assume that from an original

point of equilibrium (L K ) the production surface is t\-1isted so that the slope
0 0
of the isoquant throuEh (L K) is increased but Y(L, K)
0 0
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Simila r

Thus,

